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1
Some parts of this draws from previous writing, notably, SHANE GREENSTEIN, HOW THE
INTERNET BECAME COMMERCIAL: INNOVATION, PRIVATIZATION, AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW
NETWORK (2015), and Shane Greenstein, Nurturing the Accumulation of Innovations: Lessons
from the Internet, in ACCELERATING INNOVATIONS IN ENERGY: INSIGHTS FROM MULTIPLE
SECTORS 189 (Rebecca Henderson & Richard Newell eds. 2011).
2
The historiography of the economic literature related to government sponsored R&D
covers considerable ground that would take us far afield. Many date the literature to Kenneth
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resource for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609-626 (Richard
Nelson, ed., 1962) (at the time of this writing, Google Scholar indicates that Arrow’s article has
garnered more than one thousand citations. There has been considerable writing on the
economics of R&D in this vein, and a thorough historiography would take several books.). See
generally Kenneth Arrow, The Economics of Inventive Activity over Fifty Years, in THE RATE
AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds., 2012)
(reflecting on fifty years after the original); JONATHAN GRUBER & SIMON JOHNSON, JUMPSTARTING AMERICA, HOW BREAKTHROUGH SCIENCE CAN REVIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
THE AMERICAN DREAM (2019) (continuing this view into the context of the current U.S. R&D
system).

3
An IMP was the earliest prototype for what we today call routers. These are nodes in a
network, designed to move packets of data. To communicate with each other, both IMPs must
use the same protocols, or computer commands, to organize, send, and receive data. The IMP at
UCLA was seeking to communicate with another at the Stanford Research Institute.
4
See, e.g., JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (1999) (providing thorough analysis
of events at DARPA and NSF); ARTHUR NORBERG ET AL., TRANSFORMING COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION PROCESSING FOR THE PENTAGON, 1962-1986 (1996) (providing
thorough analysis and original interviews of events at DARPA); MITCHELL WALDROP, THE
DREAM MACHINE: J.C.R. LICKLIDER AND THE REVOLUTION THAT MADE COMPUTING
PERSONAL (2001) (tracing Licklider’s influence).
5
Several prominent U.S. politicians, most notably Al Gore, hitched agendas to the internet.
There exist cartoonish versions of these claims, largely affiliated with numerous Al Gore jokes.
See Richard Wiggins, Al Gore and the Creation of the Internet, FIRST MONDAY (Oct. 2, 2000),
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_10/wiggins/). See also GREENSTEIN (2015), supra

note 1, at 65-68 (explaining the historical origins and their (lack of) veracity).

6

Later these allocations became the object of considerable political interest and
misinterpretation. See generally Wiggins, supra note 5 (providing an overview of Al Gore’s
role in securing funding for NSF).
7
Packet switching is a method of communicating data within networks. Data are grouped
into “packets” with a header that directs the data to its destination. The remainder of the data is
the “payload,” which moves from origin to destination, where an application extracts the data.
Packet switching technology underlies all internet communications today.

8
The development of packet switching receives attention from all the historians of the
internet. See generally, ABBATE, supra note 4; NORBERG ET AL., supra note 4; WALDROP, supra
note 4; ALEX ROLAND AND PHILIP SHIMAN, STRATEGIC COMPUTING: DARPA AND THE QUEST
FOR MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 1983 – 1993 (2002).
9
DARPA did attempt to seed a private packet-switching industry in the early 1970s, but
these efforts did not get far.

10
This is an extensive story. See generally GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at Chapter 2
and 3; ABBATE, supra note 4; NORBERG ET AL., supra note 4 (explaining the early development
of packet switching and explanations for AT&T’s lack of interest). See also Greenstein (2015),
supra note 1, at 224-227 (describing its dial-up service).
11
See GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at 77-82 (detailing IBM’s early involvement in
NSF internet); 272-282 (providing an analysis of its change in strategy).
12
Other forward-looking efforts at internetworking, such as Minitel in France, were outside
the U.S., and largely ignored within the U.S. Efforts to build national electronic mail services
in the U.S. – from IBM, Lotus Notes, Compuserve, and others, also largely emerged in the
1990s, building on earlier efforts within BBS systems, and the internet eventually displaced
them. See GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at 138-148 (adding further details).

13
The initial impetus for Congress to establish DARPA came from the Sputnik crisis, and
originated out of concerns that the U.S. military lacked proper institutions to retain an innovative
edge. See generally NORBERG ET AL., supra note 4; WALDROP, supra note 4.
14
See NORBERG ET AL., supra note 4; WALDROP, supra note 4 (discussing criteria for
assessing research are discussed in both. For example, Licklider’s three criteria for funding
research still sound prescient today: “1. The research must be excellent research as evaluated
from a scientific or technical point of view; 2. The research must offer a good prospect of solving
problems that are of interest to the Department of Defense; 3. The various sponsored efforts
must fit together into one or more coherent programs that will provide a mechanism, not only
for execution of the research, but also for bringing to bear upon the operations in the Defense
Department the applicable results of the research and knowledge and methods that have been
developed in the fields in which the research is carried out.”).
15
See NORBERG ET AL., supra note 4 (stressing that DARPA’s funding of packet switching
research in the 1960s and 1970s met concerns about whether the funding was relevant to military
mission, as required by the Mansfield Amendment of 1973. The research anticipated enhancing
the “command and control” capabilities of commanders increasingly reliant on their computing
resources).
16
See GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at 125-29 (making this argument during the
discussion of the cost/benefit of the government subsidies that resulted in the invention of the
commercial Internet).

17

See Shane Greenstein & Frank Nagle, Digital Dark Matter and the Economic
Contribution of Apache, 43 RESEARCH POL’Y 623 (2014) (attempting to calculate such a
cost/benefit and unsurprisingly finding the gains far exceeded the costs of invention).

18
See ABBATE, supra note 4 (explaining how DARPA transferred part of the internet to
NSF because, in part, many civilian participants were frustrated by the challenges getting
military clearances, etc., and NSF’s leadership foresaw benefits to the U.S. academic research
community).
19
See ABBATE, supra note 4 (providing a detailed explanation. Until the NSFNET came
into existence, there was only one network and one backbone, and BBN operated it. The scale
was limited, and, in contrast, NSF anticipated supporting a much large network. Eventually the
NSFNET therefore introduced additional backbones and regional carriers.).

20
See Janet Abbate, Privatizing the Internet: Competing Visions and Chaotic Events, 19871995, 32 IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING 10 (2010) (providing a characterization of the many
points of view behind this chaotic period).
21
See DAVID CLARK, DESIGNING AN INTERNET (2018) (explaining that NSF switched from
the routing protocol Exterior Gateway Protocol (“EGP”) and replaced it with Border Gate
Protocol (“BGP”). The EGP protocol presumed a known pathway for connecting systems. BGP
enables fully decentralized routing. To internet veteran David Clark, making this change was
one of the earliest technical signs of the pending arrival of commercial network and the
retirement of NSFNET.).
22
The privatization of the internet backbone, which permitted private and public users to
both use internet protocols and share assets for doing so, would have been very difficult to grow
without these inventions.

23

See Greenstein (2011), supra note 1 (explaining a number of institutional features and
practices encouraged accumulation. Many of these practices later became the foundations for
norms and practices of open source.).

24
See NORBERG ET AL., supra note 4; Abbate, supra note 20 (discussing the inescapable
tension between oversight and discretion at DARPA, and explaining the logic for why DARPA
opted for giving program officers considerable discretion).
25
See KENNETH FLAMM, TARGETING THE COMPUTER: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION (1988); see also KENNETH FLAMM, CREATING THE COMPUTER:
GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1989) (both exploring these themes with
extensive analysis of many case studies).
26
See ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION (1988) (identifying with the
framework offered by this sentence. This and related ideas have long been found in studies of
early diffusion and adoption).

27
For an empirical example of co-invention at early adopters, see generally Timothy
Bresnahan & Shane Greenstein, Technical Progress and Co-Invention in Computing and in the
Use of Computers, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1-78 (1996).
This builds on the framework first introduced in Timothy Bresnahan & Manuel Trajtenberg,
General Purpose Technology: Engines of Growth, 65 J. OF ECONOMETRICS 83, 83-108 (1995).
A general presentation of the framework of co-invention can be found in Timothy Bresnahan &
Shane Greenstein, The Economic Contribution of Information Technology: Towards
Comparative and User Studies, 11 J. OF EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 95, 95-118 (2001).
28
See BEN R. RICH & LEO JANUS, SKUNK WORKS; A PERSONAL MEMOIR OF MY YEARS
AT LOCKHEED (1994) (explaining that the phrase, skunk works, originated from a project for the
Air Force at a division of Lockheed Martin, where it described projects to engineer new
airplanes. A special team pursued these projects, physically located away from regular
operations. The division had called itself the “Skonk Works” after a phrase from Al Capp’s Lil’
Abner cartoon – the skonk works was a “secret laboratory” that operated in the backwoods. The
label became well known throughout the industry, in part because it was considered humorous
and saucy. Lil’ Abner’s publisher eventually asked Lockheed Martin to change it, and “skunk
works” emerged from there.).

29
See NORBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 (describing how program offices used their
discretion).
30
See NORBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 17-19 (discussing the challenges of sourcing
projects from geographically dispersed group of researchers).
31
Such as BBN (in Cambridge, MA), the Rand Corporation (in Santa Monica, CA), and
Stanford Research Institute (in Menlo Park, CA).

32
See, e.g., NORBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 18-19; ROLAND & SHIMAN, supra note 8, at
2-4 (both building coherent scientific communities around nascent technologies was an explicit
part of the mission of every program officer in this era).
33
See Steven D. Crocker, The Origins of RFCs, in RFC 1000 - REQUEST FOR COMMENTS
REFERENCE GUIDE (J. Reynolds & J. Postel eds., 1987), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1000,
accessed March 2, 2020 (explaining early internet research and RFCs). See also Barry Leiner
et al., A Brief History of the Internet, Version 3.32, THE INTERNET SOC’Y, (Dec. 10, 2003),
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (showing that there is no clean line between
generations, but this is convenient language to use. “The first generation” of internet researchers
grappled with engineering, creating the first packet switching applications and prototypes, and
demonstrating the viability of the concepts. The second generation contributed to the existing
infrastructure, and, along with the first generation, built applications and scale.).

34

See Craig Partridge, The Technical Development of Internet Email, 3.2 ANNALS OF THE
HIST. OF THE COMPUTING 3, 3-29, (2008); Descriptions, LIVING INTERNET HIST. (July 2009),
http://www.livinginternet.com/e/e.htm (both providing extensive documentation of how
subsequent technical improvements built on one another, beginning with an early project at the
RAND Corporation in Los Angeles).
35
See Stephen Segaller, NERDS: A BRIEF HIST. OF THE INTERNET 105 (1998) (explaining
that the challenges of building a sound and pragmatic internetwork received the focus of most
of the researchers, and the applications were not regarded as a high priority, even though these
applications were useful and raised the value of internetworking).

36
See ABBATE, supra note 4 and Abbate, supra note 20 (both discussing how these were
complex events and involved many unexpected consequences and challenges.).

37
See, e.g., Karen Frazier, Building the NSFNet: A Partnership in High Speed Networking:
Final Report 1987-1995, MERIT NETWORK, INC. (1995), https://www.merit.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/NSFNET_final-1.pdf (providing an extensive description of NSF’s
aims and accomplishments).

38

See generally Abbate, supra note 20, and GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at Chapter
3 (explaining how the change in mission arose gradually. As the network grew to enormous
scale it became difficult for any single person to grasp how it deployed to so many locations and
altered practice.).
39
See, e.g., GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at Chapter 5 (providing additional details
about the scaling of this network for private use with the addition of competitive and independent
ISPs).

See ABBATE, supra note 4, at 197 (“In 1990, NSF manager Stephen Wolff began
discussing the idea of privatizing the internet with interested members of the internet
community, holding workshops and soliciting comments from network experts, educational
groups, and representatives of other government agencies.”).
41
See FLAMM, supra note 25 (documenting the importance of procurement for the
development of computing in the 1950, 60s, 70s and part of the 80s, especially at the military
and NASA). Arguably, the sentence in the text is an oversimplification, because procurement
of the super computers and the services to build the internet during the NSF era of stewardship
also played a crucial role in the internet’s development.
42
See, e.g., ABBATE supra note 4; Abbate, supra note 20; GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note
1, at 72-80 (both explaining how if procurement played a role, it did so in the allocation of
managerial responsibility for the NSF backbone, and arguably, in the bids to develop equipment
for the internet).
40

43

See LINDA COHEN & ROGER NOLL, THE TECHNOLOGY PORK BARREL 77-364 (1996)
(developing this theme with extensive study of several examples of government subsidized
technical inventions that crossed into commercial markets).

44

See GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at Chapter 4 (providing the full story). The Web
is several inventions bundled together to give the user the experience of hypertext. Berners-Lee
had convinced his supervisors the software had the potential to be useful for CERN. His first
example was the office directory in hypertext, which was a use inside one organization. After
making it available on shareware the most popular uses began to linking across organizations.
45
See generally ABBATE, supra note 4, at 197, for further explanation. Steve Wolff’s
decision to privatize the backbone in itself illustrates another important lesson about governance.
Wolff, the then-director of the NSFNET, recognized that there was no technical reason why the
government had to operate the internet backbone. He asserted that private firms could provide

services as efficiently, or more so, than government-managed sub-contractors. He initiated a
series of steps aimed at what would be a transfer of technology out of exclusive government
management and use. There is a broad lesson illustrated within this decision: when a technology
reaches a point where private firms can operate it, the transfer does not necessarily happen on
its own. It requires government managers who recognize this opportunity, and it may even
require active nurturing from government officials, as it did in this case. As it happened here,
Wolff had the support of the NSF’s management, but he encountered considerable resistance
from other internet stakeholders in the research community.
46
See GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at Chapter 3 (providing a full rendition). See also
Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, Fool Us Once, Shame On You – Fool Us Twice, Shame on Us:
What We Can Learn from The Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain
Name System, 79 WASH. U. L. REV. 89, 108, 113 (2001) (providing a different take on the
events).
47
See Segaller, supra note 35 (recounting partially Boucher’s role in opening the internet
to commercial use). See also Shah and Kesan, supra note 46, at 113-14 (“After the hearings,
Congressman Boucher introduced a bill to remove the NSF’s AUP. This bill was amended later
to allow commercial use of the network as long as it would increase the networks’ utility for
research and education.”).
48
See GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at Chapters 3-5 (detailing how because of the
NSF’s “acceptable use” policy, there had been little experimentation with deploying the internet
for commerce, and nothing related to exchanging data between otherwise competing firms.
There also was little understanding about its cost structure outside of an academic environment.
Relatedly, there was only experience with incentives to build routes for existing research
institutions, and virtually none with entrepreneurial incentives building routes for new users,
such as private users.).

49
See GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at Chapters 4 and 5 (providing the description of
the rise of competitive carrier industry).
50
See GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at 80-90 (providing the full story and linking IBM
to the creation of CIX and the revision of the NSF privatization plan).
51
This example also serves as a counterexample to the tendency to believe all inventions
came from within the U.S.

52
For the story of the development of the browser, see GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1,
at Chapter 4 (explaining that the browser was necessarily an unexpected invention). The web
had not yet grown at the time of the founding of NCSA. It would have taken uncommon
prescience to anticipate such an application, and the NSF (sagely) had policies in place to permit
such developments.

53
See GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at Chapter 4 and 11 (providing the full
explanations about the creation of the browser and the subsequent “browser wars.”) The license
saved Microsoft time. The strategic value from that was large, though calculating a precise
monetary value to this strategic gain would be virtually impossible. The irrefutable evidence of
the benefit to those months was the priority the CEO placed on the project, and the enormous
resources Microsoft would devote to “catching up with Netscape.”

54
That has not deterred NSF from boasting about funding this researcher. See GREENSTEIN
(2015), supra note 1, at 365-371 (explaining that NSF justifiably lists Google’s search engine as
a product of federal research, but that misses interesting historical circumstances which led to
its creation, which nobody ever promised to NSF and was not formally required by NSF as part
of their grant).
55
See GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at 365-371 (detailing how there has been a lot of
Monday morning quarterbacking about why this deal did not occur). Arguably, Stanford asked
for too much money, and/or it approached firms who did not appreciate the significance of the
inventions. Was there any price at which a deal could have resulted? Did the management
appreciate what the patent contained? Complicating this discussion further, another patent,
developed by a graduate student at Cornell and taken out at roughly the same time, covers many
similar inventions. For a number of reasons, he concluded that developing a business in the U.S.
was not possible. He moved home to China, and began the firm, Baidu, which became the
largest search engine in China.

56
See GREENSTEIN (2015), supra note 1, at Chapters 2-5 (providing extensive discussion
about the role of “honest policy wonks” from which this conclusion emerges).

